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Abstract 
This article explores a previously unknown form of interaction, known as Spring 
Sunningdale, between the British business elite and its civil servant equivalent in 
Whitehall. These began in 1963 and were still continuing only a few years ago. 
The continuity and stability of these meetings stands in contrast to wider changes 
in the nature of business-government relations in Britain during this period, 
particularly since the election of the Thatcher government in 1979. The article 
analyses why there was such continuity and what the senior civil servants and 
the captains of industry who attended these annual meetings gained from them.  
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The opening sentence of The Oxford Handbook of Business and Politics notes, ‘The 
relationship between business and government is undeniably important: both are 
major forces in our lives. They are locked inextricably in a relationship with each 
other’.1 Not only is this a symbiotic relationship but one in which the broad consensus 
since Charles Lindblom’s classic 1977 work, Politics and Markets, is that business 
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holds a position of privilege and advantage in the world of politics.2 Accordingly, 
much has been made in both the popular literature and its academic counterpart about 
the ability of business to exploit that political power to subvert democracy.3 Yet, 
despite the fundamental nature of this relationship the consideration of business 
politics by political scientists tends to focus on lobbying by business representative 
bodies framed by interest group theory, as illustrated in the recent Oxford Handbook 
on British Politics.4 Within management studies it is only in the last decade that there 
has been any significant move to incorporate political action into the study of 
corporate strategy.5 What is striking is how sparse is recent writing on business and 
politics in Britain. There have been recent textbooks by Michael Moran and Stephen 
Wilks to add to the more longstanding and multi-edition texts by Graham Wilson and 
Wyn Grant but there appears to have been no major research monograph in this area 
for a number of years.6 Business historians have traditionally given considerable 
attention to business-government relations but, to date, coverage of the period since 
1945 remains relatively limited, certainly for Britain.7 
 In other respects, however, the impact of ‘business’ frames much of the public 
administration and political science literature on the development of government in 
Britain over the last fifty years, in particular the impact of Thatcherism. From the late 
1950s, most notably in the 1968 Fulton Committee Report, criticism of Whitehall, 
especially of the higher civil service, grew.8 At its heart were repeated calls for 
improved management skills and the need to integrate business ideas, business 
methods and business people into the civil service.9 These came to a head with the 
Thatcher governments and the New Public Management associated with reforms like 
the ‘Next Steps’ programme.10 That there was an ensuing epochal transformation, a 
 3 
revolution, of the British state and of the role of business in it from the late seventies 
is now seen as ‘virtually stating the obvious’.11 
 While it may seem obvious that this constituted a revolution in business 
politics in Britain there is a surprising level of disagreement about the precise nature 
of the changes brought about as part of that transformation. According to Moran, the 
style of administration shifted from what has been termed ‘club government’, where 
informality, mutuality, secrecy and self-regulation predominated in Whitehall, to a 
world of hyper-innovation in regulation, codification and transparency.12 This 
weakened the collective political power of business in his eyes and introduced much 
firmer regulation of business. In particular, the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI) lost its insider status, which had ‘locked it, often profitably, into the world of 
the Whitehall elite’, as part of that fragmentation.13 Here, Moran builds on the work 
of Mitchell and Useem who both point to the power and influence of business, based 
on close relations between the members of a mandarin elite and their equivalents in 
business: business, particularly large companies, represent ‘the consummate insiders’, 
part of The Inner Circle.14 
 In contrast, Wilks, writing after the financial crisis, believes that Moran 
exaggerates the power of business prior to the 1970s. In particular, manufacturing was 
‘semi-detached’ from this mandarin elite, itself part of ‘The Establishment’.15 There 
was a fundamental cultural difference between business and the top of the civil 
service.16  Here, Britain is depicted as having ‘arm’s length government’ and where 
the ‘Whitehall village’ remains relatively isolated from the rest of society.17 
 This article not only better illuminates the nature of business politics in Britain 
since the Second World War but also suggests that the degree of change assumed 
conventionally needs qualification: the transformation in British business politics 
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since the 1980s has been exaggerated on the basis of the evidence presented here. The 
article examines a form of interaction called ‘Spring Sunningdale’, an annual meeting 
between the mandarins in Whitehall and leading captains of industry ‘in a relaxed and 
private setting’.18 To date, these meetings have been absent from existing 
contemporary and historical accounts: there are two footnote references to Spring 
Sunningdale in Lowe’s recent official history of the civil service.19 Beyond that there 
is one reference in a National Audit Office report to a presentation made to the 2004 
Spring Sunningdale conference, one other in an article referring to a briefing for the 
chairman of British American Tobacco in 2000 as preparation for Spring 
Sunningdale.20 Similarly, it has been impossible to find any reference to these 
meetings in The Times, The Financial Times or The Economist. This silence seems 
extraordinary given that these meetings have continued for over forty years and bring 
together the top of the civil service with leading captains of industry, but reflects their 
secret nature.21  
Starting in 1963 about fifteen selected top businessmen met a similar number 
of selected top civil servants for a weekend of discussion and socialising. This 
weekend conference, which became known as ‘Spring Sunningdale’ because of its 
timing and location at the Civil Service College at Sunningdale Park, has occurred 
annually since then, at least until 2010, its structure, it would appear, virtually 
unchanged. Having outlined the basic structure and organisation of these meetings the 
paper gives particular attention to their perceived importance, explaining why they 
were seen to be important by both business people and civil servants, and the 
implications of these contacts for our understanding of business-government relations 
in post-war Britain. 
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Spring Sunningdale 
On Friday 25th April 1969 fifteen civil servants and fourteen businessmen sat down 
for dinner together at what had just become the Civil Service College at Sunningdale 
Park, ‘a rather delightful country house with extensive grounds’ 25 miles west of 
London.22 The seating plan ensured that civil servants and businessmen were 
thoroughly intermixed. They reacquainted themselves with each other or got to meet 
each other for the first time over their starter of smoked salmon, followed by roast 
duck, served with a 1961 Chateau Batard Montrachet, a white burgundy, and rounded 
off by pear flan, cheese, coffee and a 1955 Taylor’s port. This was the start of a 
weekend of discussion among themselves in private and with no record kept, what 
had by this time become known as ‘Spring Sunningdale’. After dinner the first 
discussion began. Like the weekend as a whole it was chaired by Sir William 
Armstrong, the Head of the Civil Service and Sir Archibald Forbes, then the 
Chairman of Midland Bank (1964-75), but an ex-President of the CBI’s predecessor, 
the Federation of British Industries (1951-53), and previously chairman of the Iron 
and Steel Board before and after nationalisation (1946-50 and 1953-59). Normally the 
first discussion took the form of an informal discussion about government-business 
links and the purpose of Spring Sunningdale. Every discussion took place in a circle 
of armchairs. That year there was a three-hour discussion the following morning on 
‘The accountability of large firms’ framed around two papers on the subject, one by a 
civil servant, the other by a businessman, both of whom introduced the subject. After 
lunch the participants had free time: some went to Windsor Great Park, others played 
golf, arranged by Forbes who also paid any green fees, while some just walked in the 
grounds of the college. The second three-hour discussion was on ‘Education’ that year 
and, broken by dinner, filled the evening. There was only one paper on this occasion 
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but, as usual, two participants to introduce it. The final session, on ‘Consultation with 
government’ (with two papers and two opening speakers) occurred on the Sunday 
morning, followed by a winding up and feedback session, and after lunch the 
participants dispersed. 
 
Table 1 Participants at the 1969 Spring Sunningdale weekend conference 
  
PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
Sir Herbert Andrew  Dept. of Education 
and Science 
Donald Barron Chairman, Rowntree & 
Co. Ltd. 
Sir William 
Armstrong 
Civil Service 
Department (co-
chair) 
John Davies Director-General, CBI 
K. Barnes Dept of Employment 
and Productivity 
A.E.C. Drake Chairman, British 
Petroleum Co. Ltd. 
Frank Cooper Ministry of Defence Sir George 
Edwards 
Chairman, British 
Aircraft Corporation 
Ltd. 
Sir Basil Engholm Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food 
Sir Archibald 
Forbes 
Chairman, Midland 
Bank (co-chair) 
Samuel Goldman Treasury Philip Grimshaw Director of Finance, 
Royal-Dutch Shell 
Group 
G.G. Macfarlane Ministry of 
Technology 
Denis Haviland Chairman, Staveley 
Industries Ltd. 
R.B. Marshall Ministry of Power Hector McNeil Chairman, Babcock & 
Wilcox Ltd. 
W.A.C. Mathieson Ministry of Overseas 
Development 
A. Gerry Norman De La Rue Company 
Prof. Claus Moser Central Statistical 
Office 
David Orr Director, Unilever 
Sir William Nield Dept. of Economic 
Affairs 
Gordon Richardson Chairman, J. Henry 
Schroder Wagg Ltd. 
Sir Antony Part Board of Trade Michael Vernon Chairman, Spillers Ltd. 
W.D. Pile Home Office Charles Villiers Managing Director, 
Industrial 
Reorganisation 
Corporation 
I.V. Pugh Ministry of Housing 
and Local 
Government 
Sir Hugh Weeks Director, Industrial & 
Commercial Finance 
Corporation Ltd. 
R.T. Walters Ministry of Public 
Building and Works 
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Source: TNA T249/233, C. Gilbraith, ‘Sunningdale conference 25th-27th April, 1969’. 
 
All of the civil servants present were of the highest seniority – the majority 
headed their ministries’ administrative staff - while all the businessmen were 
managing directors, chairmen or senior board members of some of the largest 
companies in the UK, or headed key business organisations, such as John Davies, the 
Director-General of the CBI (the head of its staff) who the following year was to 
become the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in the new Conservative 
government (Table 1 sets out all those present). There were three types of 
participants: ‘regulars’ – those with a personal interest in the conference or with close 
working interests in government-business contact; ‘horses for courses’ – those invited 
because the particular topics chosen; and ‘others’ – those invited for no particular 
reason other than it was their turn or it was felt that they would benefit from the 
experience.23 The public service side was selected by Armstrong, or his equivalent as 
head of the civil service in other years, and the private enterprise side by Forbes, and 
after his retirement usually by the President of the CBI, and they also chaired the 
small steering committee which decided on the topics for discussion, and the speakers, 
and confirmed the format and arrangements. They often considered the draft papers 
prior to circulation to the participants and any feedback received from the participants. 
The format and structure of the conference in 1969 was typical, as was the range and 
type of participants. It was the eighth such conference since 1963 with a move from 
Ditchley House to Sunningdale in 1966. 
In 1997, nearly 40 years later there had been extraordinarily little change, 
apart from the dropping of the period of free time and sessions now lasting one and a 
half to two hours.24 Still located at Sunningdale Park, it began on the evening of 
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Thursday 20th February with dinner followed by an introduction and review of the 
previous year’s conference by Sir Robin Butler, the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head 
of the Home Civil Service, and Sir Colin Marshall, the CBI President (and chairman 
of British Airways), the other co-chairman of the meeting. The next day there were 
four sessions – ‘Transport policy in the UK’, ‘The City – its role and future’, ‘The 
cost-effectiveness of social security’, and ‘Eastern Europe – commercial and political 
prospects’ – followed by dinner and a discussion on the Interchange Panel report (on 
the interchange of staff between the civil service and other employers). There was a 
final session on the Saturday morning on ‘Controversial issues in corporate 
governance’. Each session was introduced by a public sector representative and a 
private sector participant and took place in a circle of easy chairs as previously too.25 
As shown in Table 2, those present remained key representatives of the corporate and 
mandarin elites and the numbers involved had not changed either. By 2004 the 
conference was shorter – a dinner followed by a full day of discussions - but 
otherwise remained the same.26 
 
Table 2 Participants at the 1997 Spring Sunningdale conference 
 
PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
Sir Anthony 
Battishill 
Inland Revenue John Browne BP 
Ann Bowtell Dept. of Social 
Security 
George Bull Grand Metropolitan 
Sir Patrick Brown Dept. of Transport Peter Davis Prudential 
Sir Terence Burns Treasury Sir Richard Evans British Aerospace 
Sir Robin Butler Cabinet Office (co-
chair) 
Niall FitzGerald Unilever 
Sir John Coles Foreign and 
Commonwealth 
Office 
Sir Ronald Hampel ICI 
Sir Russell 
Hillhouse 
Scottish Office Peter Job Reuters 
Rachel Lomax Welsh Office Sir Sydney Zeneca 
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Lipworth 
Barbara Mills Crown Prosecution 
Service 
Sir Colin Marshall CBI President 
Richard Mottram Ministry of 
Defence 
Sir Brian Moffat British Steel 
Hayden Phillips Dept. of National 
Heritage 
Sir Bob Reid London Electricity 
Michael Scholar Dept. of Trade and 
Industry 
Sir Nigel Rudd Williams Holdings 
Andrew Turnbull Dept. of the 
Environment 
Peter Smith Coopers & 
Lybrand 
Sir Nigel Wicks Treasury  Brian Staples United Utilities 
Richard Wilson Home Office Robert Wilson RTZ 
Source: FoI request 316964, released November 2012. 
 
Importance of Spring Sunningdale 
Contemporary lack of coverage of Spring Sunningdale does not mean that it was 
unimportant: it was an omission caused by ignorance not because of its insignificance. 
These meetings’ importance can be illustrated in a number of ways. First, there is 
their longevity. Senior civil servants and major company chairs and CEOs would not 
have attended if it was not found to be of value and the conference would have 
quickly been wound up rather than lasting as long as it has. Having constructed a 
dataset of attendees from available records covering 1963-1971 and 1986-2004 
(except 2001), it is clear that over 40 per cent of attendees at Spring Sunningdale 
conferences went to more than one. Table 3 sets out the most frequent attendees on 
the public sector and private sector sides: they are clearly the cream of the mandarin 
class and of the captains of industry. As might be expected given the smaller pool of 
mandarins, the most frequent attendees came from the civil service side. 
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Table 3 Ten most frequent attendees on each side at Spring Sunningdale conferences 1963-71 and 1986 to 2004 (except 2001) 
PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR 
Sir Peter 
Gregson 
Perm Secretary, Energy 1985-89, DTI 1989-96 11 Sir John Egan Chief Exec BAA 1990-99, Chairman MEPC 1998-
2000, Chairman Inchcape 2000- 06, CBI President 
2002-04 
7 
Sir William 
Armstrong 
Joint Perm Secretary, Treasury 1962-68, Head of 
the Home Civil Service and Perm Secretary, Civil 
Service Department 1968-74 
9 Sir Iain Vallance Chief Exec BT, 1986-95, Chairman BT 1987-2001 6 
Sir Clive 
Whitmore 
Perm Secretary, Ministry of Defence 1983-88, 
Home Office 1988-94 
9 Lord Sterling Chair P&O 1983-2005 6 
Sir Robin 
Butler 
2nd Secretary, Treasury 1985-87, Cabinet Secretary 
and Head of the Home Civil Service 1988-98 
8 Niall FitzGerald Chair and CEO Unilever 1996-2004 6 
Sir Russell 
Hillhouse 
Perm Secretary Scottish Office 1988-98 8 Sir Archibald 
Forbes 
Chairman Spillers 1965-68, President Spillers 
1969-80, Chairman Midland Bank 1964-74 
5 
Sir Richard 
Mottram 
2nd Secretary, Cabinet Office 1992-95, Perm 
Secretary, Ministry of Defence 1995-98, Dept 
Environment, Transport, and the Regions 1998-
2001, Transport, Local Government and the 
Regions 2001-02, Work and Pensions 2002-05 
8 Sir Peter Davis Chief Exec and Chairman Reed International 156-
94, Chief Exec Prudential 1995-2000, CEO 
Sainsburys 2000-04 
5 
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Sir Andrew 
Turnbull 
2nd Secretary, Treasury 1993-94, Perm Secretary, 
Dept of the Environment 1994-98, Treasury, 1998-
2002, Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home 
Civil Service 2002-05 
8 Sir John Banham CBI Director-General 1987-92 5 
Sir Richard 
Wilson 
Perm Secretary Dept of the Environment 1992-94, 
Home Office 1994-97, Cabinet Secretary and Head 
of the Home Civil Service 1998-2002 
7 Sir Michael Angus Chairman Unilever 1986-92, CBI President 1992-
94, Chairman Whitbread 1992-2000 
5 
Sir Douglas 
Allen 
2nd Secretary, Treasury 1963-66, Perm Secretary 
Home Office 1966-72 
6 Sir Clive Thompson Chief Executive, Rentokil 1982-2002, Chairman 
2002-04, CBI President 1998-2000 
5 
Sir Terence 
Burns 
Perm Secretary Treasury 1991-98 6 Lord Young Previously Conservative minister, Exec. Chairman 
Cable & Wireless, 1990-1995, President Institute 
of Directors 1993-2002 
4 
Source: Dataset constructed from various TNA and MRC files and the freedom of information release. 
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Other evidence of the perceived value of these occasions is also available, first 
in the attitudes of the organisers and, secondly, in the comments made afterwards by 
the participants. The organisers may not have had to spend a great deal of time 
preparing for Sunningdale  but it was taken seriously with Steering Committee 
meetings at various points in the year to reflect on past experience and to plan the 
topics and speakers for the coming meeting. In particular, both sides were keen to 
make sure that only good quality individuals attended, a time-consuming process. On 
the business side, Archibald Forbes took on this task for ten years and even when civil 
servants recognised that his contribution at Sunningdale was beginning to wane, they 
recognised the importance of his contribution in ensuring the selection of appropriate 
individuals.27  
In addition, the value of Spring Sunningdale was clear from the comments 
made afterwards by participants. From the very beginning there was a constant stream 
of praise from both civil servants and from the representatives of private industry. The 
responses of two businessmen in 1963 having been at the first meeting were typical: ‘I 
found it very interesting and extremely worthwhile’; and ‘The conference was 
extremely interesting and I am quite sure very useful and it was, of course, conducted 
in the most congenial surroundings’.28 Over 30 years later the same sentiment 
remained: ‘Sunningdale was, as always, a most stimulating couple of days and I much 
appreciated being asked to participate. It is a forum which has worked extremely well 
over the ten years that I have been involved and I certainly value my invitation’.29 
Perhaps most effusive was Sir Alexander Glen, the Arctic explorer and chairman of H. 
Clarkson & Co. , ‘Having attended quite a number of weekend courses both in this 
country and in the States, I would certainly rate this by far the most fascinating I have 
ever had the good fortune of attending’.30 
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However, perhaps the most significant evidence was that Spring Sunningdale 
became the parent of a range of offshoots. A second form of interaction and 
networking between public servants and private businessmen was created as part of 
the original initiative behind Spring Sunningdale. It proved slightly harder to get 
started and so did not run until 1964 but, like Spring Sunningdale, then became an 
annual institution. ‘The Node’ was ‘a “junior” version of Sunningdale’ in the eyes of 
Armstrong and Forbes.31 Nevertheless, the format was different from Sunningdale, 
although it again involved bringing businessmen and civil servants together. ‘The 
Node’ was so named because, apart from its very first year, it took place at the Shell-
Mex B.P. Staff college of that name. The course lasted for about two weeks during the 
summer and there was a director of studies – in 1969 it was the historian Asa Briggs. 
There were 22 participants that year, 11 from private business, 10 from the civil 
service and one from the nationalised industries. Like Spring Sunningdale, its format 
did develop over time but, again, remained remarkably consistent, certainly into the 
1990s, by which time it was called the Summer Node, although it did not always take 
place at the Node any more. By then there was also a Winter Node – a weekend much 
like Sunningdale which began in 1987 because the general election made the timing 
awkward for the Summer Node – and, the most recent innovation, a Young Node for 
‘young high fliers’ – a two-week programme – which began in 1991.32 
 All of this -  its longevity and stability in an era of reform, the praise it 
received from participants and the offshoots that have been created both at the outset 
and since – suggests that Spring Sunningdale was a forum valued by both senior civil 
servants and leading business people. Now we can turn to consider why this was the 
case. 
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Explaining the value attached to Spring Sunningdale 
One reason to explain the enduring value attached to Spring Sunningdale has already 
been mentioned above by the participants: it was intellectually stimulating. However, 
there were two other related aspects which were consistently highlighted as the aims 
of Spring Sunningdale and the Node and which were also referred to by participants. 
One was the desire to improve mutual understanding.33 Armstrong often made this 
point in his invitation letter to civil servants: these conferences ‘provide a valuable 
opportunity for exchanging ideas and experience with people in commerce and 
industry’.34 Robin Butler, Armstrong’s 1990s equivalent, felt similarly: ‘These 
conferences are valuable, not least in enabling your side and ours to spend some time 
together and get a sense for the way each other thinks’, and businessmen expressed 
similar views.35  
 Indeed, this was one of the initial motives for the suggestion to create these 
sorts of events. Both Spring Sunningdale and the Node arose out of an informal dinner 
party in August 1962 attended by six of the most senior civil servants and six equally 
senior businessmen to discuss the relationship between the civil service and private 
enterprise and how it might be improved.36 The initiative for the dinner came from Sir 
Norman Kipping, the Director-General of the Federation of British Industries, and its 
purpose was: 
 
To dream up methods of exposing industrial and commercial management on 
the one hand and the administrative civil service on the other to one another, 
with a view to avoiding the loss of all the mutual understanding and respect 
which grew up through the many contacts during the war. 
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  Several people have spoken to me about this, in particular Nutcombe 
Hume who unfortunately cannot be there, and several of them have 
emphasised that they are not concerned only or even mainly about the top-level 
people, but about much younger men lower down, who simply do not meet out 
at all out of school.37 
 
Certainly there had been a huge explosion in the number of businessmen who were 
incorporated into the government machine during the war, including Archibald Forbes 
who joined the Ministry of Aircraft Production.38 The vast majority returned to 
business, just as many academics returned to universities. However, many maintained 
the personal links built up during the war, but by the early 1960s many of these 
individuals were reaching retirement. 
Possible solutions to this problem suggested by Kipping in 1962 included staff 
interchange, some sort of staff college, the formation of dinner groups etc., and the 
formation of joint committees. Following the meeting Kipping suggested that a 
weekend conference of fifteen senior civil servants and fifteen representatives of 
private enterprise might meet to discuss the matter further. This proposal was 
endorsed by the then joint heads of the civil service and it was from this that what 
became Spring Sunningdale emerged and, in turn, the Node course.39  
 However, there was a second, related, motive behind Kipping’s initiative. The 
quote above continued, ‘It is possible to see very clearly the growth of those extreme 
forms of cageyness and even distrust which make for the worst kind of personal 
relationships and this we want to try to correct’, and his proposals were, ‘based on the 
idea that meeting together and discussing together are the best available methods of 
encouraging the development of mutual respect, and if you can throw in as well 
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drinking together, so much the better’.40 Or, as Sir Nutcombe Hume put it on learning 
of these developments, they were to try ‘to recreate war-time camaraderie’.41 In a 
similar vein, one senior civil servant later emphasised the role of ‘hospitality, meals 
and receptions’ in improving communication between civil servants and business. She 
continued, ‘My experience is that there is no doubt that you learn a great deal more 
about the facts of business, the constraints, opportunities, attitudes and values, across 
a table which is essentially a social occasion, than if you confine yourself to formal 
meetings’.42  
Such informal and relaxed social interaction was viewed as extremely valuable. 
Indeed, participants at Spring Sunningdale regularly commented on the opportunity 
offered to renew old acquaintances and to make new ones.43 The Node was less about 
renewing contacts as making new friends and that the main advantage was the 
prospect of a longer-term pay-off. One participant put it like this: 
 
The main advantage of this kind of course, which is directed at a relatively 
small number of individuals each year, is the prospect of a longer-term pay-off 
insofar as at least some of the members may be expected to rise to top 
positions in their field of activity.44 
 
Indeed, the explanatory background note for the 1979 Node course made this explicit: 
 
The main object of the course is to establish long-term contacts between the 
civil service and industry through a mutual understanding of each other’s 
problems and methods of work…. Contacts made at the Node usually endure. 
Most courses have regular reunions, sometimes two or three times a year. Even 
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more important, regular contacts are often maintained through the medium of 
problems which are related to the two sectors.45 
 
Clearly mutual understanding and the creation of a lasting network of contacts was of 
value to the participants and it might be argued should have led to improved decision-
making both in Whitehall and in business. However, to what extent was this 
opportunity exploited by the participants and how close was the relationship between 
this business elite and its Whitehall counterpart?  
 
What did the two sides gain? 
a) Gains for business 
Since the state is potentially the greatest influence on the business environment 
clearly any opportunity to understand and to influence civil servants’ thinking was 
advantageous to business.46 However, although the topics discussed at Spring 
Sunningdale are known, there is no evidence of the content of the discussions so it is 
hard to evidence the impact of the discussions. An issue where it is possible to say 
more is that these talks were bilateral, thereby excluding trade unions. Clearly, 
occasions like Spring Sunningdale and the Node offered immediate and long-term 
advantages to business given that there was no equivalent bilateral meeting between 
civil servants and trade unionists. Whether trade unionists should be invited to Spring 
Sunningdale was discussed in the first years of its existence. Participants at this time 
regularly commented that the presence of trade unionists would have been useful.47  
Then at the 1969 Spring Sunningdale conference there was a concerted call for 
trade union attendance: 
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Almost from the outset, it was noted that the unions have never been 
represented at these conferences and this was almost universally regretted…. 
Archie Forbes and I had to explain that there had been more than one approach 
(although not in the last year or so) to George Woodcock [General Secretary 
of the TUC] about this but that he had not proved receptive; possibly some 
fault lay with us in that I am not sure that the unions were clearly offered full 
parity of representation. It was certainly recognised last weekend that such 
parity would be desirable from the conference’s point of view and probably 
essential from the TUC point of view. It was also recognised that such 
representation would create a new kind of conference and that we might need 
to see how best this could be arranged, possibly outside the procedure for the 
Spring Sunningdale conference… and, at least in the first instance, ad hoc. But 
in any event, it was thought that it would usefully have a similar prime 
objective, namely the provision of an informal occasion for senior people on 
all sides to meet each other, with the discussion of particular subjects 
providing simply the focus for discussion.48 
 
Perhaps reflecting why it was seen as so important in 1969 to involve trade unionists 
in Spring Sunningdale, this was not a propitious time for such a venture given the 
high tensions between the TUC and the Labour government over the latter’s proposals 
to reform industrial relations following the publication of the controversial White 
Paper In Place of Strife that January.49 Armstrong was advised to delay any approach 
to the TUC until after its autumn conference as there was no chance of a favourable 
response before then.50 The issue was raised again after the conference, though there 
was some uncertainty about how best to proceed, and in November the TUC and CBI 
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had their own bilateral meeting, but at the next Spring Sunningdale steering 
committee meeting there was no reference to trade union participation and the issue 
was left untouched during 1970.51 Thereafter the issue was mentioned occasionally 
but Spring Sunningdale remained a bilateral conference solely for public servants and 
business people.  
 In addition to the opportunity provided by Spring Sunningdale for a general 
pro-business agenda to be presented to senior civil servants without interference, it 
also offered an opportunity for individual companies to exploit. It has been argued 
that such corporate political activity is important in achieving and sustaining a 
company’s competitive advantage.52 Having access to such senior civil servants and 
networking with them increased the capabilities and resources of the companies 
concerned in absolute terms and relative to other companies.53 In 1994 in her letter of 
thanks for Sunningdale Baroness O’Cathain added, ‘I have already taken advantage of 
the fact that we got to know people at Sunningdale in smoothing out a little local 
difficulty – much quicker than would have been prior to Sunningdale!’54 Similarly, 
Ian McAllister (Ford Motor Company) noted, ‘Of course the contacts will be 
extremely useful in the future’.55 
More serious was the evidence found by Fooks et al. that Martin Broughton of 
British American Tobacco Industries (BAT) was briefed about using the Spring 
Sunningdale conference in 2000 to put the company’s line to the Permanent Secretary 
of the Ministry of Health, Chris Kelly.56 In preparing the brief it was noted that this 
three-day ‘pow-wow’ at Sunningdale offered ‘plenty of time for talking one-on-one 
for key stakeholders’.57 Broughton wanted to know the history of BAT contacts, 
particularly on ‘the scientific issues’, with those civil servants to be present as he ‘was 
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keen to break the impasse with Mr Kelly’. Following Sunningdale, Broughton wrote 
to Kelly: 
 
I very much appreciated the opportunity for our brief conversation at the 
Spring Sunningdale and in particular your willingness to consider how we 
might take the discussion forward.  
 As I mentioned when we met, we have been giving a great deal of 
thought as to how we might engage more constructively with regulators, 
legislators, public health authorities and the academic community to address 
the issues surrounding our products. 
 I very much regret that the co-operative efforts of the past between the 
UK tobacco industry and the government have in recent years become all too 
often characterised by conflict and mutual misunderstanding. I would 
particularly appreciate an opportunity to learn more from you about the major 
concerns and priorities for the Department of Health on tobacco, to help us 
understand the concerns in more depth, and to help inform our own thinking 
about how we might be able to contribute appropriately to positive solutions.58 
 
That the conference offered the opportunity for such a politically sensitive company 
as BAT to talk in private about building a relationship with the head of the department 
responsible for the government’s health policy well illustrates how advantageous 
Sunningdale could be for the individual companies that participated. 
 Research would also tend to suggest that Sunningdale should also have been 
of benefit to the individual business people involved. Social network analysis 
highlights the implications of being at the heart of a network and on the business side 
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most of the frequent attendees were part of Useem has called the Inner Circle, those at 
the heart of the network of business interlocks in Britain.59 More than being central, 
those that attended Spring Sunningdale spanned the boundary between business and 
the civil service.60 As such, they filled a key function as social brokers that bridged 
two separate networks (within business and within Whitehall). Maclean et al. have 
argued that such brokerage is particularly important in Britain where there are 
relatively weak ties within the corporate elite.61  
 
b) Gains for civil servants 
If businessmen gained privileged and exclusive access to senior civil servants through 
the Spring Sunningdale conferences, what did these senior civil servants gain from 
these occasions? First, networks often have the feature of homophily, that is sustained 
networks tend to be made up of ‘people like us’.62 Sunningdale offered an opportunity 
to find businessmen with similar values.63 This could be useful in providing potential 
members of public authorities and committees, something for which there always 
seemed to be a shortage of suitable candidates. Thus in the 1990s much was made of 
the appointment of a businessman as an ‘outsider’ to the civil service’s Senior 
Appointments Selection Committee. This ‘outsider’ was Sir Michael Angus, organiser 
of Sunningdale as CBI President in the early 1990s and frequent attendee (see Table 
3). As has been commented, ‘SASC is trying to have it both ways; on the one “hand 
they are claiming there is an outsider within their number, but on the other hand it is a 
chap we know who will not rock the boat”’.64 
 Of more direct personal benefit to senior civil servants was the creation of 
contacts in business which might lead to appointments on their retirement from the 
civil service at the age of sixty. After the Second World War a number of senior civil 
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servants did move to the boards of major companies. Sir Leslie Rowan from the 
Treasury became chairman of Vickers and attended Spring Sunningdale in that 
capacity. Sir Richard Powell, who had been Permanent Secretary at the Board of 
Trade, became the first individual to attend Spring Sunningdale as both a civil servant 
and then as a businessman in 1971.65 Much has been written about the probity of civil 
servants taking such business appointments – the ‘revolving door’ between business 
and Whitehall - and of the value to major companies of having an ex-Whitehall 
mandarin on the board.66 Certainly, there would appear to be a demand from business 
for such individuals: Antony Part was apparently offered three jobs on his last day in 
the civil service, accepting two.67 Such non-executive directors are seen to play a key 
role in providing a bridge between the company board and other elites and acting as 
‘conduits of social influence’.68 As one civil servant who moved into the private 
sector put it, his advantage over competitor companies was not getting favourable 
treatment, but having ‘a way in’, ‘I knew the right person to phone and understood 
how the organisation works, its dynamics, motivation’.69 All of the civil servants 
listed as the most frequent participants at Spring Sunningdale in Table 3 went on to 
hold positions as company chairmen or non-executive directors, though, for some, this 
was just one of a range of retirement activities. 
 However, it is the case of William Armstrong himself that stands out in this 
respect. In the early seventies Armstrong reached the height of his influence, which 
exceeded that of other heads of the civil service.70 However, at the start of 1974 he 
had a complete mental and physical breakdown and decided to take early retirement.71 
Having become closely linked with the 1970-74 Conservative government’s economic 
policies, he was unpopular with Labour MPs. They were incensed in April 1974 
because he was given special dispensation to retire early and take up a post in private 
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business after about six months whereas the existing code of practice laid down that 
senior civil servants had to wait two years before they were allowed to do this. It is 
not the special dispensation from the Prime Minister which is relevant here, rather it is 
that he was taking a directorship at the Midland Bank with a view to becoming the 
bank’s chairman in 1975.72 What is relevant here and has received no attention 
previously was that the bank’s retiring chairman was none other than Sir Archibald 
Forbes with whom Armstrong had worked with in organising and chairing Spring 
Sunningdale.  
 
Spring Sunningdale and the closeness of relations between the corporate elite 
and the mandarin elite 
A number of authors agree with Useem and Mitchell that there has been an inner 
circle of business people who have ready and regular access to senior civil servants, as 
such substantiating the idea of a ‘power elite’ in Britain.73 Useem points to ‘the 
frequent, casual contact among London managing directors and senior civil servants’, 
continuing, ‘Luncheons, receptions, and dinners are continuous, and weekend retreats 
add special intimacy’.74 Similarly, one Labour minister referred to the ‘atmospheric 
pollution’ of the civil service by contact with business: ‘It’s the way they drink 
together, play golf, or go shooting beforehand [before civil servants take jobs in 
business]. Nothing is ever said directly; but the civil servants know what to expect’.75 
Others, including civil servants, have referred to good relations between the civil 
service and business.76 
It has been shown here that Spring Sunningdale has played a role in creating 
and maintaining personal ties between individual business people and individual civil 
servants. In that respect, they helped to make the boundary between Whitehall and the 
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rest of society more permeable than is conventionally presented in the image of ‘arm’s 
length government’. However, while the contact between business and the civil 
service may have been in relative terms far greater than with trade unionists and other 
parts of society and that this has given business a privileged position, one needs to be 
careful not to exaggerate the extent of interaction. After all, the dominant critique of 
the civil service since the late 1950s has been its’ closed, isolated and monastic 
tendencies – the Whitehall village of Heclo and Wildavsky - and that senior civil 
servants - the ‘cardinals of bureaucracy’ of Lord Rothschild – reflect these tendencies 
most of all.77 Similarly, although some talk about the close relationship between 
mandarins and the captains of industry, others, including some of those involved, 
focus on the degree of separation. Thus Digby Jones, Director-General of the CBI 
2000-06 and an attendee at Sunningdale, has commented that ‘business and the 
government do not pull the boat in the same direction in this country’, while Sir Peter 
Carey, a permanent secretary and another attendee at Sunningdale, saw his job as 
‘building bridges’ because ‘industry understands very little about how government 
works’, continuing, ‘I think in this way we break down what is at the moment, it 
seems to me, a cultural barrier between the private sector and the public sector, which 
is highly undesirable and works against the national interest’.78 
 Turning to Sunningdale itself, the original initiative in the early 1960s was to 
respond to a fear that ‘mutual understanding is being replaced by mutual suspicion’.79 
One industrialist at that time felt that he was ‘constantly encountering a feeling of 
“we” and “they” among fellow industrialists when relations with Whitehall were 
mentioned’.80 Again, much of the praise for Spring Sunningdale and the Node and the 
value attached to them was because such contact was so rare.81 If top businessmen 
really were insiders one would not expect an annual weekend like Spring Sunningdale 
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to be talked about in quite the glowing terms that it was. Here it is relevant that one of 
the notes drafted for the 1962 dinner which led to these developments suggested that 
one of the problems was that ‘business life in this country is very 
“compartmentalised” i.e. as between Whitehall, industry, the City, and the educational 
world and there is insufficient serious appreciation of each other’s life and 
problems’.82 Over thirty years later a participant at the Node course commented that 
the course would remain a stimulating experience ‘whilst the UK remains such a 
compartmentalised society’.83 The use of the same word to describe British society is 
striking. It was because of such compartmentalisation that these meetings remained of 
such perceived value to the participants. Business people were insiders more than 
trade unionists but there were limits to what being an insider meant.   
 
Reasons for secrecy 
Particularly in the early years it was this issue of not being seen to privilege business 
over trade unions that explains why there is so little knowledge of Spring Sunningdale 
despite it taking place for so long. Certainly, that it remained secret was not an 
accident: there was a conscious effort not to advertise its existence. In December 1962 
a joint meeting was held to discuss the first conference (held at Ditchley). At the 
meeting Laurence Helsby, the new head of the civil service, noted that he hoped that 
the conference would not attract any public notice.84 Accordingly, Norman Kipping 
wrote to the provost at Ditchley before the conference making clear that not only was 
it a ‘quite private and informal gathering’ but that, ‘we do not want to attract any press 
or other kind of notice’.85 In addition, a press briefing was prepared just in case the 
press found out about it. The note quoted the Plowden Committee Report on the 
Control of Public Expenditure which had recommended that the civil service could 
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‘learn from the experience in the private sector, and vice versa’.86 This appears to 
have been more of a subterfuge than a true explanation since there had been no 
mention of the Report in any of the discussions between business and the civil service 
that led to the meeting and had no basis as one of the reasons for why business had 
approached civil servants in 1962.  
 Each year a press briefing was drafted in case of press questioning but the 
meetings remained ‘entirely unnoticed by the Press’ into the 1970s.87 The desire of 
those involved to keep the existence of Spring Sunningdale secret remained. Thus, 
when the historian Alan Bullock was asked as convenor of the Node conference to 
draft an article for The Times to publicise the course, Archibald Forbes was worried 
that it would lead to unwanted publicity for Spring Sunningdale, and when William 
Armstrong was interviewed by Graham Turner, for his book Business in Britain, 
Armstrong declined to mention either the Node or Spring Sunningdale because it was 
policy to keep Sunningdale private.88 This was even though he was aware that in the 
light of the criticisms of the Fulton Report mentioning these events would have 
presented a much better story of the relations between civil servants and business 
people.  
Why were Sunningdale conferences kept so secret? They ‘have always 
deliberately been kept quiet’, wrote one civil servant, ‘because of the risk of 
misunderstanding politically and vis à vis the trade unions’.89 However, concerns 
about trade union reaction cannot have been the only reason for the secrecy: as the 
position of trade unions has weakened over time and the status of business risen so 
this explanation becomes less persuasive. Just as Armstrong did not publicise the 
meetings so they remained secret through the 1980s despite the many criticisms made 
of the civil service and its need to learn from business. It might have assuaged some 
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of the criticisms of the isolation of the higher civil service if the existence of Spring 
Sunningdale had been made public. Indeed, while the Prime Minister knew of the 
meetings and had to endorse the expenditure, other ministers seem to have been as 
ignorant of their existence as the general public. 
This would suggest that Spring Sunningdale should be seen as a sign of the 
continuation of ‘club government’ by senior civil servants and that the changes after 
1979 towards greater formal regulation in Whitehall and transparency did not 
completely overturn this tendency. That secretive, informal twilight world continued 
into the twenty-first century hidden by a cloak of ‘non-publicity and virtual non-
existence’.90 There were limits to the revolution in Whitehall.91 
 
Conclusion 
This article has brought into the open a previously virtually unknown form of 
interaction between business and government in post-war Britain. In so doing it has 
sought to explain the significance of Spring Sunningdale and why it has endured so 
long in the form that it has. It has been shown that it brought together leading business 
people and top civil servants in the same bilateral way for a surprisingly long period. 
This suggests that both parties viewed these links as valuable and successful despite 
the changing environment in which they took place. Making and sustaining contacts 
of this sort and building a better understanding of each other were seen as important 
and necessary. Equally, these arrangements smack of social elitism in the way that 
trade unions were not party to them at any point over many years, even when there 
was a Labour government. This gave big business preferential access to Whitehall 
compared to small firms and trade unions. It is hard to quantify or illustrate the impact 
of this but sustained as it was over such a long period it certainly cannot have done 
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any harm to the cause of big business and examples have been given of how these 
business people and civil servants were able to use links created or developed at 
Spring Sunningdale for their benefit.   
 Nevertheless, it would be overstating the case to suggest that this epitomised a 
cozy relationship between business and the top of the civil service in some absolute 
sense. As has been shown, business-government relations, and British society more 
generally, in this period could be depicted as compartmentalised. Indeed, it was 
precisely because of this compartmentalisation that such a meeting – just one 
weekend each year – was perceived to hold such value. This does not smack of an 
inner circle of business people closely integrated with a bureaucratic elite or, more 
generally, of a coherent power elite. Related to this, the nature of the business-
government interaction at Spring Sunningdale adds to our understanding of corporate 
political activity. The conventional approach to studying this has been to view the 
business elite as those at the heart of the network of interlocking directorates.92 
However, many of those businessmen who were the most frequent participants at 
Spring Sunningdale were known more for their direction of single companies – Lord 
Sterling, Iain Vallance, Niall FitzGerald and Peter Davis are examples – yet clearly 
from their presence at Spring Sunningdale they should be seen as key elements of any 
inner circle that existed in British business.93 This suggests that while the notion of 
interlocking directorates is a key aspect in understanding the political activities of 
business, it may be misleading to focus exclusively on this aspect. There is a danger 
that trying to explore corporate political activities solely through the idea of 
interlocking directorates may be overly narrow in the way that it frames business 
politics. 
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 However, perhaps the most significant finding is the continuity that is 
illustrated by this case. The longevity of Spring Sunningdale, the lack of change in its 
structure and format show that revolutionary as the transformation in business politics 
may have been in many areas since the 1980s, here is an important example of 
sustained continuity. Moran has argued that the Thatcherite transformation destroyed 
the CBI’s insider status.94 This may well be true for its relationship with some 
Conservative ministers but its relationship with senior civil servants did not change in 
the same way. It was the CBI President, or sometimes his proxy, who acted as the key 
organiser on the business side and who would select the invitees from business. 
Similarly, while the case of Martin Broughton trying to influence government policy 
came from the 2000s, it would be dangerous to assume on this one piece of evidence 
that this represented a shift towards Spring Sunningdale being dominated by the large 
companies more than previously. Big business had always been those given 
preferential access right from the start in 1963 and there is no evidence to suggest that 
those present acted any differently in exploiting the opportunities offered by Spring 
Sunningdale in the 2000s than they did in the 1960s.  
 Turning to the mandarins, again there is no evidence to support the 
conventional account of the weakening of their position, rather it is continuity that 
stands out. The example of Spring Sunningdale shows that the twilight world of club 
government was not eradicated by the changes introduced since the 1980s, as Moran 
has suggested. To the contrary, it continued as if nothing had changed. That Spring 
Sunningdale could remain as good as secret to this day raises doubts about the degree 
of transparency that has been introduced. Moreover, civil servants were willing and 
able to keep the existence of Spring Sunningdale out of the public domain rather than 
using its existence to deflect public approbation at the isolation of the higher civil 
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service from business. This was one area where mandarins were able to retain their 
autonomy and power. Likewise, the comments of business people remained as 
enthusiastic about the experience and value of Spring Sunningdale in bringing them 
together with senior civil servants as they had been in the 1960s. 
 Finally, the example of Spring Sunningdale illustrates that historians, 
including business historians, still have much to contribute to key debates about 
postwar Britain. Much remains unexplored despite the relative wealth of archives and 
quantity of contemporary social science research undertaken at the time. Historical 
research on corporate political activities is starting to flourish and adding cases like 
Spring Sunningdale increases our understanding of just how complex and diverse 
interactions between business and government have been and still are. 
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